The common law baseline
Singapore, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and British Columbia and the federal sphere in Canada share the same starting point: a post-employment restraint is void as contrary to public policy unless the employer proves a legitimate proprietary interest (trade secrets, customer connection, in some places workforce stability) and the restraint goes no further than reasonably necessary in duration, territory and scope. Courts in Hong Kong and England will not rewrite an overbroad clause; New South Wales and New Zealand courts may read one down. Three to six months is the typical enforceable range for most employees; twelve months is reserved for the most senior and best-informed. Non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses are judged more leniently and do most of the practical work.
Jurisdictions with statutory limits or bans
| Jurisdiction | Position at the review date |
|---|---|
| United States (California) | Void under Business and Professions Code s 16600; since 1 January 2024 unlawful to include or attempt to enforce, including out-of-state agreements (ss 16600.1, 16600.5). Delaware enforces reasonable restraints but declines to blue-pencil. The FTC's 2024 rule is not in force. |
| Canada (Ontario) | Prohibited for agreements made on or after 25 October 2021 under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, except on the sale of a business and for executives with chief-officer titles. Other provinces: common law. |
| Taiwan | Labor Standards Act Article 9-1: valid only with a legitimate interest, employee access to trade secrets, reasonable scope and reasonable compensation paid for the restricted period; maximum two years; otherwise void. |
| Australia | Common law restraint doctrine; exposure draft bill (2026) to ban non-competes for employees at or below the high income threshold and restrict no-poach and wage-fixing; consultation closed October 2026; not enacted at the review date. |
| United Kingdom | Common law; 2023 proposal for a three-month cap not implemented; government announced in October 2026 an intention to legislate limits. |
| Singapore | Common law; Ministry of Manpower working on tripartite guidance for restrictive clauses, not issued at the review date. |
| Japan | No statute; courts enforce only reasonable restraints weighing role, duration (one year common), scope and compensation. |
| Malta | Reasonableness and legitimate interest; EU Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive limits exclusivity during employment. |
| Hong Kong, New Zealand | Common law reasonableness; New Zealand court may modify an unreasonable restraint; New Zealand government has signalled a review. |
Check the authority before relying on any of these; several are moving.
What makes a restraint enforceable where it is allowed
- A defined interest: name the trade secrets, customers or key staff the clause protects.
- A role that justifies it: senior, client-facing or technically privileged.
- A short period tied to how long the information or relationship stays valuable.
- A territory and activity scope matched to where the employee actually worked.
- Consideration: a new restraint imposed mid-employment needs fresh consideration in most common law jurisdictions, and Taiwan requires paid compensation for the restricted period.
- Severability drafted as separate, independent covenants so that a court may strike one without the rest.
The reliable alternatives
Garden leave keeps the employee employed, paid and out of the market during a long notice period, and is enforceable in every common law jurisdiction because the employee suffers no loss; the United Kingdom government's 2026 announcement also mentioned long notice periods, so this may change. Non-solicitation of customers and staff for six to twelve months is enforced more readily than a non-compete. Confidentiality and trade secret protection apply indefinitely and are backed by statute in the United States (Defend Trade Secrets Act), Japan (Unfair Competition Prevention Act), Taiwan (Trade Secrets Act), the United Kingdom and Malta (Trade Secrets Directive), Singapore and elsewhere. Equity forfeiture for competing (a bad leaver provision in an option plan) is a commercial consequence rather than a restraint and survives in most places, though California scrutinises it.
Drafting across borders
A group template with one non-compete for all countries will be unenforceable in California and Ontario, void in Taiwan without compensation, and overbroad in Singapore, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. The LegalMatrix cross-border employment contract takes the opposite approach: a jurisdiction-specific restrictive covenant schedule, included only where enforceable and only at the client's request, with the review note recording the position and the alternatives selected. Executives and founders are a separate case; restraints in a shareholders' agreement or on the sale of a business are judged more generously than employment restraints in every jurisdiction, and Ontario's ban expressly excludes them.
Choice of law does not rescue a restraint. California Labor Code section 925 prevents an employer from imposing another state's law or forum on an employee who primarily lives and works in California, and section 16600.5 voids out-of-state non-competes as a matter of policy. Ontario's prohibition is a term of the Employment Standards Act, which applies to work performed in Ontario regardless of the contract's governing law. Courts in Singapore, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom apply their own public policy on restraint of trade to employees working there even under a foreign-law contract. The practical rule is that the law of the place where the employee works decides, so the covenant must be drafted to that law.
What to tell managers
Treat a non-compete as a deterrent rather than a guarantee, and invest in the controls that work everywhere: access management for trade secrets, documented confidentiality obligations, customer relationships held by the company rather than the individual, and notice periods long enough to allow a handover. Where a departing employee joins a competitor, the first step is a letter reminding them of confidentiality and non-solicitation obligations; litigation on a non-compete is the last.
Sources
- Ontario: non-compete agreements ↗
- California Department of Industrial Relations ↗
- Taiwan Labor Standards Act ↗
- Fair Work Ombudsman ↗
- Singapore Ministry of Manpower ↗
Reviewed 26 October 2026. Rules and fees change; confirm with the authority before relying on them.